How the Titan was built: the materials, decisions and mistakes behind the accident

The Titan submersible that imploded on its way to the Titanic in June 2023, killing five people, was the product of controversial design choices, ignored warnings and a lack of external oversight—failings that were laid bare during a United States Coast Guard-led inquiry in 2024.

The investigation, held more than a year after the disaster, revealed a pattern of engineering shortcuts, internal disputes and missed opportunities to prevent the tragedy. Testimony from experts, engineers and former employees painted a picture of a company under financial strain, pushing ahead with risky dives despite serious concerns about safety.

The marine vehicle was carrying five individuals – Hamish Harding, Paul-Henri Nargeolet, Shahzada Dawood, Suleman Dawood, and Stockton Rush (OceanGate CEO) – who lost their lives when a catastrophic implosion occurred as it descended to view the remains of the famous transatlantic liner.

A flawed hull from the start

Central to the inquiry was the Titan’s carbon fiber hull, which experts said had manufacturing defects from the outset: folds, porosity and voids in the material. According to Don Kramer, an engineer with the National Transportation Safety Board, two different sensors on the submersible had recorded a loud acoustic event during a dive in July 2022, nearly a year before the fatal implosion. Hull fragments recovered after the accident showed significant delamination in the carbon fiber layers.

The decision to use carbon fiber—rare in deep-sea applications—was a key point of criticism. While lightweight, the material is considered unreliable under extreme pressure. Each dive would have compressed and weakened the hull further, increasing the risk of failure with every descent.

Unconventional design, no independent checks

The sub’s shape also drew scrutiny. Instead of the standard spherical form used in deep-sea vessels, Titan’s hull was cylindrical, meaning the immense underwater pressure wasn’t evenly distributed.

The viewing window raised further concerns. It had only been rated for depths of 1,300 metres—less than a third of the depth Titan aimed to reach. Joints between the carbon fiber and the titanium end caps were also seen as structural weak points.

Despite repeated concerns, OceanGate did not submit the vessel for third-party certification—standard practice in the submersible industry. That omission became one of the focal points of the investigation.

Veteran submersible expert William Kohnen, a member of the Marine Technology Society, testified that OceanGate had ignored industry advice. His company, Hydrospace, had designed a hybrid flat-curved window at OceanGate’s request, but Kohnen said he warned that it couldn’t be certified by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers because it did not meet standard criteria. “It’s not a standard window,” he recalled telling the company. “A full series of tests is required.”

Early warnings unheeded

The inquiry also revisited warning signs that had emerged years earlier. In April 2019, deep-sea expedition operator Karl Stanley joined OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush for a test dive in a Titan prototype off the Bahamas. Unbeknownst to Stanley, the vessel had been struck by lightning prior to the dive.

During the descent, Stanley reported hearing ominous cracking sounds. “It sounded like carbon fiber fracturing,” he told the inquiry. The prototype was retired later that year after a pilot reported finding a large internal crack in the carbon fiber shell. A new hull was built using the same core systems—this became the final version of Titan.

Reflecting on the experience, Stanley told investigators he believed OceanGate had come “very close to killing me.”

Financial pressure and cut corners

The inquiry also shed light on OceanGate’s financial struggles and the pressures they created. Amber Bay, the company’s Director of Administration, said development and operations were funded through a mix of investor backing and passenger fees. A single seat aboard the Titan rose from $150,000 in 2021 to $250,000 by 2022.

Passengers who didn’t reach the Titanic were not refunded, but invited to rebook on future expeditions—meaning trips were often financed by deposits from new customers. The model created scheduling pressure and tight cash flow.

Bay insisted the company wasn’t desperate to conduct dives, but admitted there had been “a real urgency to deliver what we had promised.”

Former OceanGate engineering director Phil Brooks went further. He told the inquiry that financial stress had led to compromised safety standards. “It was clear the company was under serious economic strain,” he said. “As a result, decisions were being made that I believed compromised safety far too much.”

Titan: A preventable disaster

By the end of 2024, the inquiry had heard repeated warnings that had gone unheeded. Titan’s unconventional materials, its unusual design, its lack of certification and the financial model behind it all combined to create what many in the industry saw as a disaster waiting to happen.

OceanGate had claimed to be pushing boundaries in deep-sea innovation. But as Kohnen put it, the problem was never the ambition—it was the execution. “We didn’t want to stop him,” he said of Stockton Rush. “We wanted him to do it right.”

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